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“The philosophy of the school room in one generation will be the
philosophy of government in the next.”1
-Abraham Lincoln
I.

INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 1996, New Jersey Governor Christine Todd
Whitman, acting before a joint session of the State Legislature, signed the
Charter School Program Act of 1995 (“the Act”) into law.2 The symbolic
nature of this event was evident from the surrounding circumstances, as
it was the only State of the State Address in New Jersey history dedicated
solely to one topic: education reform.3 Prior to Governor Whitman
signing the bill into law, no charter schools existed in New Jersey. The
Act, which made New Jersey the twentieth state to authorize the creation
of charter schools, was largely a response to the universal outrage
accompanying the publication of A Nation at Risk, a 1983 report from
President Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in
Education.4 The Commission’s report highlighted the “rising tide of
mediocrity” in American education and ultimately, sparked state efforts
to revitalize American public schools.5
“Alternatives to traditional public schooling based on choice and
autonomy became critical to the revitalization efforts.”6 New Jersey’s
1 Education
Quotes,
BRAINYQUOTE,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/abrahamlin133687.html?src=t_education (last
visited Feb. 3, 2015).
2 Robert J. Martin, Article, Rigid Rules for Charter Schools: New Jersey as a Case Study,
236 RUTGERS L.J. 439, 445 (2005).
3 Id. at 525 (citing Joseph V. Doria Jr., The Function of Political Capital in the New Jersey
Legislature’s Traditional Role in the Formulation of Educational Policy: A Participation
Observation Illustrated by the Charter School Act of 1995 (2000) (unpublished dissertation,
Columbia University) (on file with author)).
4 Jason M. Barr, Alan R. Sadnovnik, & Louisa Visconti, Charter Schools and Urban
Education Improvement: A Comparison of Newark’s District and Charter Schools, 38 URB.
REV. 291, 291 (2006); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK:
THE
IMPERATIVE
FOR
EDUCATIONAL
REFORM
(1983),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html.
5 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html;
see also Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 291.
6 See Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 292; see also ARNOLD SHOBER, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: OUT OF MANY, ONE? 196 (2012) (stating that the charter
school concept was a “middle-of-the-road response” to the insufficiencies of traditional public
schools and the “constitutional threats” of a voucher program).

FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE

11/3/2015 3:49 PM

361

Charter School Program Act mirrors the aforementioned efforts. For
example, a brief glimpse at the introductory sections of the Act indicates
that the legislature intended to “assist in promoting comprehensive
educational reform by providing a mechanism for the implementation of
a variety of educational approaches which may not be available in the
traditional public school classroom,” and increase the “educational
choices available” for students and parents.7 In other words, the
Legislature designed charter schools to be public school alternatives, to
provide school choice to students and parents, and encouraged charter
schools to experiment with new forms and philosophies of education.
While the public greeted the Act’s passage with some optimism, the
Act’s initial results were anything but promising. Within the first six
years of the Act’s enactment, the New Jersey Department of Education
(“NJDOE”) listed sixteen charter schools as “closures,” including several
charter schools that were approved, but never opened.8 Nevertheless, by
the end of the 2004–2005 academic year, over fifty charter schools were
in operation.9
According to the NJDOE, as of the 2012–2013 academic year,
approximately eighty-seven charter schools operate in the State.10
Arguably, these statistics demonstrate success in the growth and
proliferation of charter schools in New Jersey. Not all academics have
viewed this propagation positively, however. Some education scholars
view this growth as undesirable and harmful to the interests of students
and society as a whole. Scholars like Bruce Baker, Julia Sass Rubin, and
Mark Weber have pointed to numerous structural and accountability
issues within the New Jersey charter laws and the charter school
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-2 (West 2014) (“The Legislature finds and declares that the
establishment of charter schools as part of this State's program of public education can assist
in promoting comprehensive educational reform by providing a mechanism for the
implementation of a variety of educational approaches which may not be available in the
traditional public school classroom. Specifically, charter schools offer the potential to
improve pupil learning; increase for students and parents the educational choices available
when selecting the learning environment which they feel may be the most appropriate;
encourage the use of different and innovative learning methods; establish a new form of
accountability for schools; require the measurement of learning outcomes; make the school
the unit for educational improvement; and establish new professional opportunities for
teachers.”).
8 See Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 293.
9 Id.
10 N.J.
Dep’t of Educ., New Jersey Public Schools Fact Sheet,
http://www.state.nj.us/education/data/fact.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (reporting facts for
the 2012-13 academic year).
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movement as a whole.11
These scholars, through their concerns, have identified one troubling
aspect of the current state of the New Jersey charter laws; there has not
been a major, substantive amendment to the Act since its creation. 12
“[T]he body of law pertaining to charter schools in New Jersey has
evolved in several stages since 1996, but at no point has there been a
systemic revision.”13 During the twenty-year period since the passage of
the Act, there have been numerous attempts to pass sweeping charter
reform legislation without success. Most recently, State Senator M.
Teresa Ruiz (D-Newark) introduced Senate Bill 2319, a charter reform
bill viewed by at least one commentator as the “best-chance version of a
new charter-school law.”14 Nevertheless, in both the Senator’s interviews
and public comments to media outlets, Senator Ruiz has asserted that this
bill is the “starting point” towards the ultimate goal of meaningful charter
reform.15
In order to inform the conversation surrounding Senate Bill 2319,
this Note will describe the bill, compare its provisions to another recently
proposed bill that failed to garner enough support in the New Jersey
Assembly, and posit a scheme that will promote meaningful charter
reform that serves the best interest of students while adhering to the Act’s

11 See Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, Assoc. Professor, Rutgers Univ.,
Edward J. Bloustein Sch. of Planning & Pub. Policy (Sept. 26, 2014) (Professor Rubin
lamented the lack of local control over charter school creation/expansion, the lack of a
requirement that charter school demographics mirror those of the sending districts, weak
language banning for-profit charter schools, and insufficient accountability and transparency);
Mark Weber, Opinion: Was It Something We Said About Garden State’s Charter Schools, NJ
SPOTLIGHT (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/11/13/opinion-was-itsomething-we-said-about-nj-s-charter-schools/ (citing to a recent study that he authored along
with Julia Sass Rubin, which points to racial and ethnic disparities between charter school
populations and their district counterparts).
12 Adrienne Lu, New Jersey Should Update Charter School Law, Committee Told,
PHILLY.COM
(Jan.
25,
2011),
http://articles.philly.com/2011-0125/news/27047567_1_charter-schools-public-school-schools-greater-flexibility
(“New
Jersey’s 15-year-old charter school law should be updated to improve accountability and
transparency”).
13 Martin, supra note 2, at 451.
14 John Mooney, Long-Discussed Charter-School Reform Bill Finally Gets Legislative
Hearing, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/10/16/longdiscussed-charter-reform-bill-finally-gets-hearing/.
15 Telephone Interview with Senator Teresa Ruiz (D-Newark), N.J. State Senator (Dec.
1, 2014); Mooney, Long-Discussed Charter-School Reform Bill Finally Gets Legislative
Hearing, supra note 14 (Senator Ruiz referred to Senate Bill 2319 as the “start of the
conversation”).
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goal of promoting school choice. Part II of this Note provides a basic
description of charter schools and how they operate, and analyzes the
current state of the charter school laws in New Jersey. Part III describes,
in detail, Senate Bill 2319’s provisions and how they materially alter the
current charter school laws. Part IV examines the most prominent
criticisms of Senate Bill 2319 as articulated by Professor Julia Sass Rubin
of Rutgers University and determines whether those criticisms are
harmonious with the purpose of the Act. Finally, Part V suggests three
legislative suggestions to be considered in relation to Senate Bill 2319,
and the general effort to provide for a more efficient charter school
assessment and approval process while upholding the original purpose of
the Act; namely, school choice.
These legislative suggestions are: prohibit local school boards and
populations from providing binding input, require an in-depth analysis of
charter school demographics as compared to their local neighborhoods,
feeders, and applicant pools prior to any discussions of lottery-system
reform, and enact a provision that charter schools receive funding
equivalent to their district counterparts.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY’S CHARTER SCHOOL
LAWS: THE BASICS
A. The Charter Contract
“A charter school is an independently run public school granted
greater flexibility in its operations, in return for greater accountability for
performance.”16 A “charter” is a contract governing the performance of a
charter school, and the Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”) is
the individual who grants the charter.17 A charter describes the school’s
“mission, program, goals, students served, methods of assessment, and
ways to measure success.”18 In other words, the Commissioner and an
individual charter school enter into a performance-based contractual
relationship. Initially the contract is for a four-year period and may be
renewed for a five-year period.19 Should a charter school fail to meet the
objectives and obligations laid out in the charter, the Commissioner has
16

Frequently Asked Questions About Public, Charter Schools, UNCOMMON SCHOOLS,
http://www.uncommonschools.org/faq-what-is-charter-school (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
17 N.J.
Dep’t
of
Educ.,
What
is
a
Charter
School?,
http://www.nj.gov/education/chartsch/about.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2015); see also Barr et.
al, supra note 4, at 292.
18 Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 292.
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-17 (West 2014).
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discretion to place a charter under a probationary status or revoke the
charter and shut down the school.20
In order to assess a charter’s school compliance with the charter
contract, the Act requires the Commissioner to “annually assess whether
each charter school is meeting the goals of its charter.”21 To expedite the
Commissioner’s annual assessment, charter schools are required to
submit an annual report to the Commissioner, the local school board, and
the county superintendent.22 The annual report must contain data
assessing the achievement of school goals, the efficiency of internal
governance, performance on state tests and assessments, the level of
parental involvement, as well as a financial plan.23 In essence, charter
schools are required to submit a deluge of information to the
Commissioner for assessment purposes.
Typically, when it is evident to the Commissioner that a charter
school is not in compliance with its charter contract, the Commissioner
will place the school on a probationary status in order to allow for the
implementation of a remedial plan.24 Based on the success of the
probationary remedial plan, the Commissioner will decide whether to
revoke the charter and shut down the school, extend the probationary
period, or remove the charter school from probation and allow it to
continue operations.25
B. Financing a Charter School
Charter schools are publically funded and are not allowed to charge
tuition.26 Instead, the burden of financing charter school operations falls
directly on the local school district. Specifically, the Act requires the
local school district to pay a charter school “90% of the sum of the budget
year equalization aid per pupil and the prebudget year general fund tax

20 Id. (“The commissioner may revoke a school’s charter if the school has not fulfilled
any condition imposed by the commissioner in connection with the granting of the charter or
if the school has violated any provision of its charter. The commissioner may place a school
on probationary status to allow the implementation of a remedial plan after which, if the plan
is unsuccessful, the charter may be summarily revoked.”).
21 Id. § 18A:36A-16(a).
22 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-16(b).
23 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.2(a)(1)–(b)(3) (West 2015).
24 Id.; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.4(a) (2015).
25
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.4(a)(4)–(6).
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(a) (“A charter school shall not charge tuition to students
who reside in the district.”).
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levy per pupil inflated by the CPI rate most recent to the calculation.” 27
Additionally, “the school district of residence shall pay directly to the
charter school the security categorical aid attributable to the student and
a percentage of the district’s special education categorical aid equal to the
percentage of the district’s special education students enrolled in the
charter school and, if applicable, 100% of preschool education aid.”28 In
simpler terms, charter schools are supposed to receive about 90 percent
of the per pupil funding that a district school would receive for a student.
Other than the antecedent provisions, all charter schools must adhere to
New Jersey Annotated Code section 6A:23A, which consists of
regulations governing the budgeting procedures and financial
accountability standards of all public schools.29
On a related note, charter schools, when contracting with private
parties, must comply with the New Jersey Public School Contract Law.30
Like most other public contract laws, the New Jersey Public School
Contract Law requires a school to award most contracts for goods,
services, and capital improvements to the “lowest responsible bidder.”31
C. Charter School Admissions and Enrollment Policy
In terms of student enrollment, the Act requires that charter schools
be “open to all students on a space available basis.”32 Enrollment
preference is given to students residing in the public school district where
the charter is situated or in the charter school’s region of residence if so
designated.33 Should the number of applications for admission to a charter
school exceed the number of seats available, the charter school must
select students using a “random selection process,” usually in the form of
a public lottery.34 Furthermore, a charter school’s admission policy, “to
the maximum extent possible,” must pursue the enrollment of a “crosssection” of the local community’s school-age population, “including
27

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-12.
Id.
29 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-4.13.
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:18A-1; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-3.1(c).
31 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:18A-1.
32 Id. § 18A:36A-7.
33 Id. § 18A:36A-8(a); N.J. ADMIN CODE § 6A:11-1.2 ("District of residence" means the
school district in which a charter school facility is physically located; if a charter school is
approved with a region of residence comprised of contiguous school districts, that region is
the charter school's district of residence).
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(a); N.J. ADMIN CODE § 6A:11-1.2
28
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racial and academic factors.”35 Adhering to federal law, the statute does
not impose quota requirements. Instead, the statute places the burden on
the individual charter school to obtain diversity. 36 Regulations pertaining
to the Act require the Commissioner to annually appraise the “segregative
effect that the loss of the students may have on its district of residence.” 37
Furthermore, charter schools cannot discriminate against applicants
based on their intellectual ability, athletic ability, mental or physical
handicap, proficiency of the English language, or any other
discriminatory measure that would be considered illegal if employed by
a public district school.38 For students with limited English language
proficiency, a charter school must provide “all required courses and
support services to meet the Core Curriculum Content Standards.”39 In
relation to students with educational disabilities, New Jersey regulations
require that charter schools offer free education to students with learning
disabilities in compliance with the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”).40 Nevertheless, a charter school may limit their
admissions policies to specific grade levels or concentrations, such as
math or the arts.41
Finally, it is important to note that a charter school may expel
students.42 A charter school may expel a student based on criteria
contained within the school charter that is consistent with state law
dictating how public schools may expel students, and the Commissioner
must ultimately approve it.43

35

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(e).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (collectively prohibiting the use of quotas
in admissions policies); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also
Martin, supra note 2, at 470–71.
37 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.1(j); Martin, supra note 2, at 471.
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-7.
39 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-4.7.
40 Id. § 6A:11-4.8.
41
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-7.
42 Id. § 18A:36A-9.
43 Id.
36
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III. SENATE BILL 2319
A. Context
As mentioned in the introductory section of this Note, numerous
charter reform bills have been introduced in the New Jersey State
Assembly, but have ultimately failed.44 Most notably, in May of 2014,
Assemblyman Troy Singleton (D-Burlington) introduced a charter
reform bill that aimed to satisfy proponents and critics of charter school
expansion.45
Assemblyman Singleton referred to his bill as a
“compromise.”46 For example, the bill provided that thirty percent of the
criteria for state approval of a new charter school would be the local
school board’s vote.47 Additionally, Assemblyman Singleton’s bill would
have provided state funding for facilities and given charter schools first
rights on vacated district school buildings. 48 Finally, the bill would have
created a nine-person charter school authorization board that would have
made recommendations to the Commissioner, who would retain final say
over charter school openings.49
Despite the accommodating nature of Assemblyman Singleton’s
bill, it inspired neither charter proponents nor critics. On the one hand,
the New Jersey Charter Schools Association (“NJCSA”), a non-profit
member organization devoted to representing the charter school
community, supported the effort Assemblyman Singleton expended, but
ultimately, questioned the wisdom of local input and the retention of final
charter school approvals with the Commissioner rather than with the
proposed nine-member authorization board.50 On the other hand, Save
Our Schools NJ, which has advocated for a local approval requirement to
be added to the current charter law, did not support the bill because it
lacked “binding” local input in the charter school approval process. 51
44 John Mooney, Fine Print: Charter-School Bill Chock Full of Details -- Some New,
Some
Familiar,
NJ
SPOTLIGHT
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/10/20/fine-print-charter-school-bill-chock-full-ofdetails-some-new-some-familiar/.
45 John Mooney, Reform Bill Could Reshape Landscape for Charter-School Approvals,
NJ SPOTLIGHT (May 23, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/05/22/reform-billcould-reshape-landscape-for-charter-school-approvals/.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50
Id.
51 Mooney, Reform Bill Could Reshape Landscape for Charter-School Approvals, supra
note 45.
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Ultimately, Assemblyman Singleton’s bill failed to muster enough
support in the Assembly and has been stuck in committee since January
2014.52
It was in the aftermath of Assemblyman Singleton’s failed charter
reform attempt that State Senator M. Teresa Ruiz (D-Newark) proposed
her own charter reform bill, Senate Bill 2319, a bill that she had been
working on even prior to the introduction of Assemblyman Singleton’s
proposed bill.53 At least one commentator views Senate Bill 2319 as the
“best-chance version of a new charter-school law.”54 Senator Ruiz was
adamant in clarifying that the bill is a “work in progress” and not in its
final form.55 In Senator Ruiz’s opinion, the lack of any meaningful,
substantive reform of New Jersey’s charter laws is indicative of
legislative inattention to the Act.56 Senator Ruiz believes that student
needs have evolved since the passage of the Act, and will continue to
change over time; therefore, it is important to revisit the provisions laid
out in the Act, to ensure that student needs are addressed.57 Thus, Senator
Ruiz introduced Senate Bill 2319 in order to take a significant step
towards satisfying the needs of current and future students.58
B. The Text of Senate Bill 2319
Senator Ruiz’s proposed bill contains some provisions found in
earlier charter reform bills proposed in the Assembly, and it contains
some new provisions as well.59 Also, it makes a number of substantive
changes to the Act. Namely, the bill creates a charter school authorization
board that shares charter authorization powers with the Commissioner;
requires that a school district selling or leasing a school facility must grant
52 NJ
STATE
LEGISLATURE,
BILLS
2014-2015,
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp?BillNumber=A436.
53 John Mooney, Assemblyman Unveils Much-Anticipated Final Draft of Charter
Legislation,
NJ
SPOTLIGHT
(Jan.
22,
2014),
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/01/21/assemblyman-unveils-much-anticipatedcharter-bill/.
54 Mooney, Long-Discussed Charter-School Reform Bill Finally Gets Legislative
Hearing, supra note 14.
55 Telephone Interview with Senator Teresa Ruiz, supra note 15.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 John Mooney, Fine Print: Charter-School Bill Chock Full of Details -- Some New,
Some Familiar, supra note 44 (referring to the new authorization board and “request for
proposal process,” while simultaneously pointing out familiar provisions requiring charters to
meet charter performance goals and provide access to students with disabilities.).
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right of first refusal to a charter school; requires the use of a certified
public lottery where the number of applicants exceeds the number of
available spaces at a charter school; and, as part of the application review
process, provides for two public meetings in any district where a
proposed charter will be located.60
i. Charter School Authorization Board
The most fundamental, structural change to the Act relates to the
State’s ability to enter into a charter contract with a charter school. Senate
Bill 2319 proposes the creation of a charter school authorization board
that will share charter authorization and review powers with the
Commissioner. Specifically, the language of Senate Bill 2319 states,
“[t]he bill establishes the charter school authorizing board that will, in
addition to the Commissioner of Education, serve as a charter school
authorizer.”61
The proposed board would be comprised of nine members.62 The
Governor would appoint three members, various other government
leaders would appoint four members, and the President of the State Board
of Education and the Executive Director of the New Jersey School Boards
Association would serve as ex officio members.63 To avoid any sort of
political maneuvering, the bill mandates that no more than four members
of the board shall come from the same political party. 64 Additionally, to
ensure that the charter school board would exercise expertise in the
charter school approval process, the bill requires that authorizers have
experience in “public and nonprofit governance, management, finance,
public school leadership, assessment, curriculum, instruction, and public
school law.”65
Under Senate Bill 2319, while the authorization board would
exercise great power, the State Board of Education would still provide
“oversight of the charter school authorizing board, and would have the
authority to suspend the charter school authorizing board’s activities . . .
if the State board determines that the charter school authorizing board is

60
61
62
63
64
65

S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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deficient in performing its duties.”66 To make sure that the authorization
board can adequately operate, the bill requires the appropriation of
$250,000 to fund it.67
ii. Public Input in the Charter School Application Review
Process
Senate Bill 2319 adds a new section directly impacting a charter
authorizer’s review of a charter school application. First, pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, the bill provides for the promulgation of
regulations, which enumerate nationally followed practices and criteria
for charter school authorizations.68 Under Senate Bill 2319, a charter
school authorizer would be bound to follow those regulations when
assessing a charter school application.69
Moreover, Senate Bill 2319 provides for two additional steps in the
application process: an interview and public meetings. 70 First, the bill
mandates an “in-person interview with each charter school applicant.” 71
The bill provides no guidance as to which individuals an authorizer would
be meeting, but presumably, a charter school applicant would send a
designated representative or their board of trustees.72 Second, and most
notably, Senate Bill 2319 provides for “two public meetings” where “the
residents of the school district that would be served by the charter school
would have an opportunity to provide input on the application.”73 Under
the original Act, there was no provision granting any sort of public input
in the charter school approval process. Much like Assemblyman
Singleton’s proposed legislation, the imposition of two public meetings
in Senate Bill 2319 is likely an attempt to appease those commentators
calling for local input in the charter school approval process.

66

S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Rg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
73 Id.; N.J. ADMIN CODE § 6A:11-1.2 (West 2015) ("District of residence" means the
school district in which a charter school facility is physically located; if a charter school is
approved with a region of residence comprised of contiguous school districts, that region is
the charter school's district of residence).
67
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iii. Mandatory Certified Public Lottery
The Act provides that a charter school must employ a “random
selection process,” whenever the number of applicants seeking admission
to a charter school exceeds the number of space available.74 At first
glance, the phrase “random selection process” seems like a nebulous term
that provides charter schools with great latitude in choosing a random
selection process. Senator Ruiz’s bill eliminates that amorphous
characteristic. Instead, Senate Bill 2319 mandates the use of a “certified
public lottery” where the number of applicants exceeds the space
available, essentially codifying a common practice in the charter school
industry.75 Additionally, in the spirit of transparency and oversight,
Senate Bill 2319 requires a charter school to include lottery procedures
in their charter school application.76 Charter school authorizers are then
responsible for developing procedures for publicizing and certifying a
public lottery conducted by a charter school.77
IV. CRITICISMS OF SENATE BILL 2319
On September 26, 2014, Julia Sass Rubin, an Associate Professor at
the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers
University and co-founder and volunteer member of Save our Schools
NJ, a grassroots, volunteer education advocacy organization, provided an
interview. Rubin has critiqued the current charter school law as needing
greater local control components, more transparency, and a means to
address an apparent demographic mismatch between charter and district
schools.
Rubin’s concerns and criticisms of the current charter laws and
Senate Bill 2319 fall under four umbrella categories: (1) the lack of
binding local control over charter school “establishment, expansion, or
closure;” (2) the lack of a requirement that charter school demographics
“mirror those of the sending districts;” (3) the lack of stronger language
prohibiting “for-profit charter schools;” and (4) insufficient charter
school accountability and transparency.78 This Note will address the local
control and demographics concerns in detail, while reserving the “forprofit” charter school issue and the accountability and transparency issues
74
75
76
77
78

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(a) (West 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11.
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for another article.
A. Local Binding Control Over Charter Schools
Rubin believes that Senate Bill 2319’s creation of a charter school
authorization board “diminishes” local control over charter school
creation, expansion, and closure.79 Rubin points out that the creation of a
charter school authorization board is the product of model legislation put
forth by interest groups like the National Alliance of Charter School
Authorizers (NACSA), an advocacy organization dedicated to crafting
and publishing charter school evaluation and authorization standards, and
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a politically
conservative lobbying organization with which NACSA contracted to
pass the model legislation.80 In essence, Rubin argues that Senate Bill
2319 allows pro-charter interest groups to dictate charter school policy
rather than allowing local communities or the State Board of Education
to do so.81
Furthermore, Rubin takes issue with the “political” nature of the
proposed charter school authorization board.82 As mentioned previously,
Senate Bill 2319 provides for a nine-person authorization board with its
members appointed by various governmental actors, such as the
Governor, President of the Senate, and Assembly Speaker among others.83
Additionally, the Commissioner and the NJDOE oversee this board.
Rubin argues that the NJDOE does not have the resources or capacity to
oversee this new entity and that it is a board consisting of political
appointees lacking accountability to the local community. 84 In other
words, Rubin believes that this “political but diffused” board removes
responsibility for charter approvals from the Governor and
Commissioner and places it in a board that is much harder to hold
accountable.85

79

Id.
Id.
81 Id. (citing James Osborne, In New Jersey, Nonprofit at Center of Education Conflict,
PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER
(Jan.
17,
2012),
http://mobile.philly.com/news/?wss=%2Fphilly%2Fnews%2Fhomepage%2F&id=13745666
3&deliver=iphone&c=y&viewAll=y#more.).
82 Id.
83
S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Rg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
84 Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11.
85 Id.
80
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As such, Rubin believes that Ruiz’s proposed bill does not reflect
the needs and desires of local communities and does not provide for any
form of local control over charter schools. Rubin does not feel that the
requirement of two public community meetings proposed in Senate Bill
2319 constituted community control, as the bills did not include any
requirement that charter authorizers adhere to the community wishes
expressed at those meetings.86 She argued that Senate Bill 2319 “gives
local communities no ability to influence a charter school’s creation,
expansion or closure.”87 Rubin also pointed out that NACSA has openly
stated that the intent of the authorizing board is to override local control.88
Instead, Rubin recommends that a local vote be conducted for every
charter school approval, expansion, or closure.89 Rubin is not alone in her
call for a local vote requirement. In an April 2011 opinion piece,
Assemblyman Patrick Diegnan (D-Middlesex), Chair of the Assembly
Education Committee, opined that charter schools should have to “prove
their worth to the public” before they can open and spend taxpayer
money.90 To justify this opinion, Assemblyman Diegnan argued that
“[o]ur democracy relies on giving the community a voice,” and local
control is the “right thing to do.”91 Rubin has cited similar democratic
principles in support of the call for a local vote.92
If a direct vote was not possible, Rubin felt that a vote by a
popularly-elected school board would be an acceptable alternative.93
Rubin emphasized that an appointed school board in a state-controlled
district, such as exists in Camden, is not accountable to the local
community and would not be an acceptable alternative to a direct popular

86

Id.
Id.
88 Id. (citing NACSA Policy Brief – Creating Independent Chartering Boards, NAT’L
ASS’N
OF
CHARTER
SCHOOL
AUTHORIZERS,
http://www.qualitycharters.org/assets/files/Documents/Policy/Creating%20Independent%20
Chartering%20Boards.pdf (“In states where only school districts serve as authorizers, some
communities are likely to be overseen by districts that are hostile to all charter applications,
which effectively stops all chartering.”)).
89 Id.
90 Patrick J. Diegnan, Jr., Let New Jersey Voters Make Decision on Charter Schools,
NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM.COM
(Apr.
14,
2011),
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/commentary/let-voters-make-decision-on-charterschools.
91
Id.
92 Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11.
93 Id.
87
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vote or vote by a popularly-elected, locally-controlled school board.94
B. Requiring that Charter School Demographics Mirror the
Sending District
Rubin also argues that Senate Bill 2319 does not sufficiently address
the apparent demographic disparity between charter schools and school
districts, as documented by Rutgers Professor Bruce Baker and others. 95
A month after the interview, Rubin, and Rutgers doctoral student, Mark
Weber, published a research report that compared the demographic
composition of New Jersey charter and district schools.96
Weber and Rubin’s study looked at charter and district school
demographics across the state of New Jersey, paying particular attention
to seven urban communities.97 The method of the study compared the
overall charter school demographics in each community to those of the
sending districts. Weber and Rubin concluded that charter schools “serve
a population that is very different demographically than that of their host
districts.”98 Namely, Weber and Rubin found that charter schools
educated “a significantly smaller percentage of economically
disadvantaged students” than did their host districts; charter schools only
educate “one-sixth the percentage of Limited English Proficient (LEP)
students;” and a smaller percentage of special needs students.99
Furthermore, the study asserts that special needs students at charter
schools have less expensive classifications than the students at district
schools. The study also found that charter schools educate fewer males,
a smaller percentage of Hispanic students, and a higher percentage of
Black students than do their host districts.100
To remedy the ills noted in the study, Weber and Rubin make a
number of policy recommendations. First, they recommend that the
NJDOE conduct a universal lottery process for all charter schools,
94

Id.
Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11.
96 MARK WEBER & JULIA SASS RUBIN, NEW JERSEY CHARTER SCHOOLS: A DATA-DRIVEN
VIEW, PART I (2014), available at http://www.saveourschoolsnj.org/save/corefiles/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/NJ-Charter-School-Report_10.29.2014.pdf.
97 Id. (The seven urban communities analyzed by the study were Camden, Hoboken,
Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, and Trenton).
98 Id. at 4.
99
Id. (Rubin and Weber used Free Lunch and Free or Reduced Price Lunch students as a
marker of economic disadvantage).
100 Id. (reporting 62% v. 40%).
95
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consisting of a single application deadline in order to promote
transparency and make it “easier for economically disadvantaged and
Limited English Proficient Families to apply.” 101 Moreover, Weber and
Rubin promote the use of a “weighted lottery” in order to increase the
admission of higher percentages of economically disadvantaged or LEP
students.102 Finally, Weber and Rubin propose tying “demographic
parity” to a charter school’s funding.103 Under the proposed parity
scheme, for example, a charter school that fails to match 90 percent of
their host district’s demographic would receive a “lower reimbursement
rate per student.”104 Pursuant to the results and suggestions included in
the study, Rubin criticizes Senate Bill 2319 for its failure to ensure charter
school populations reflect the district of origin population.105
V.

LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS
The purpose of this Note is to assess the charter reform topic by
interviewing prominent individuals in the field of education reform and
policy. The interview with Senator Ruiz was meant to reveal the thoughtprocess and motivations behind the crafting of Senate Bill 2319 from the
perspective of a policy-maker. The purpose of interviewing Julia Sass
Rubin was to understand the perspective of an education scholar who
possesses reservations about the current state of the charter school law
and Senate Bill 2319. Based on the information gleaned from both
Senator Ruiz and Professor Rubin, this Note endeavored to research the
strengths and weaknesses of the current charter school laws, Senate Bill
2319, and the concerns put forth by Rubin.
The research has resulted in the following legislative suggestions to
be considered in further negotiations surrounding Senate Bill 2319: (1)
do not provide for binding local control over the creation, expansion, or
closure of charter schools; (2) do not create any legislation requiring a
weighted lottery or other mechanism forcing charter schools to mirror the
demographics of the local district; and (3) enact a provision that charter
schools receive funding equivalent to their district counterparts.

101

Id. at 5.
WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 96 (explaining a weighted lottery would involve creating
more lottery entries for targeted communities).
103
Id. at 6.
104 Id.
105 Telephone interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11.
102
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A. No Binding Local Control
Despite the importance of voting in a democratic society, any
imposition of local binding control over charter schools would further
empower entrenched political groups to dictate charter school policy
rather than allowing a local population’s voice to be heard. Additionally,
education reform, in general, is a complex topic requiring expertise in
order to come to an informed opinion, and local populations, regardless
of educational attainment or socio-economic status, do not possess
expertise in relation to education policy. Therefore, control over charter
school creation, expansion, and closure should remain with the NJDOE,
the Commissioner, and the charter school authorization board proposed
by Senate Bill 2319 because they possess education policy expertise and
are sufficiently isolated from political pressures.
The NJDOE is an administrative agency possessing expertise in the
field of education. Since the passage of the Act, the NJDOE, specifically
the Commissioner, has been vested with ultimate discretion over the
creation of charter schools.106 The reason for vesting this discretion in the
NJDOE and the Commissioner is because administrative agencies and
their agents are valued for their “expertise, efficiency and bureaucratic
neutrality.”107
Agencies are staffed with individuals possessing
experience in the areas regulated by the agency, and “agencies and their
staff develop experience over time that allows them to make more
informed policy decisions.”108 In terms of efficiency, agencies can “act
more quickly using streamlined procedures.”109 Finally, in relation to
bureaucratic neutrality, one fundamental assumption about
administrative agencies is that “sound policy judgments are best made
through the neutral application of scientific knowledge.” 110
Administrative agencies are “somewhat removed from political
pressure.”111
While these virtues are present in administrative agencies, they are
not present in the local population or school board. No method exists to
ensure that local voters have expertise when it comes to education policy
issues. Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly
106

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-17 (West 2014).
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION
IN LEGAL CONTEXT 6 (2d ed. 2014).
108 Id. at 6.
109
Id.
110 Id. at 7.
111 Id.
107
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recognized the value of administrative expertise in the sphere of
education. For example, in In re Proposed Quest Academy Charter
School of Montclair Founders Group, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that the Commissioner did not act in an “arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable” manner in relying upon local community input and her
own expertise in rejecting a proposed charter school in Montclair. 112
Specifically, Justice LaVecchia noted that courts have “recognized the
value that administrative expertise can play in the rendering of a sound
administrative decision.”113
Additionally, local popular votes are not necessarily efficient.
Elections cost money and take time. They must be scheduled in advance
to provide the local citizenry with proper notice of the election. On the
other hand, agencies can respond to issues more quickly and effectively
due to their streamlined procedures.114 Finally, a local electorate is not
neutral. By their very nature, people will sometimes vote based on their
political beliefs rather than based on what benefits them.
Nevertheless, individuals who support local binding control over
charter school-related issues will claim that local schools boards are more
accountable to the voters and better reflect the will of the people as
opposed to a politically appointed commissioner. However, there is a
multitude of information that demonstrates that local school boards are
not politically neutral, and thus their accountability to local populations
can be called into question. The best way to understand the lack of local
school board neutrality is to look at the monopolization of power over
local school boards by teachers unions. Historically, teachers’ unions,
despite public statements of support, tend to view charters as “threats to
public schools and teacher jobs” and have even fought their creation and
expansion.115 Nevertheless, for the purpose of this Note, union sentiments
are secondary to teacher union mobilization and power over local election
processes.
A number of factors impact the influence of teachers’ unions over
local school boards: low voter turnout, high turnout among teachers, and
massive amounts of campaign contributions to local school board
candidates. First of all, local school board elections have “relatively low
112

216 N.J. 370 (2013).
Id. at 389.
114
Id.
115 T.M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS
103 (2011).
113

AND

AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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visibility” and low voter turnout, and this renders the elections
particularly susceptible to vested interests.116 For example, when local
school board elections are held on the same day as a national or statewide
election, voter turnout averages about 44 percent; whereas when a local
school board election is held as a special election, turnout only averages
about 26 percent.117 Furthermore, nearly 96 percent of school board seats
are elected through these low-turnout elections.118
Additionally, as voters, teachers tend to turnout in large numbers in
local school board elections, especially as compared to nonteacher
turnout. In 2006, T.M. Moe orchestrated a study in Southern California
and found that teachers were two to seven times more likely to vote in
school board elections than were their nonteacher peers.119 Therefore,
high teacher turnout combined with low non-teacher turnout gives
teachers’ unions inordinate amounts of influence over elections.
Furthermore, teachers’ unions tend to spend money to influence
local elections. T.M. Moe, in a 2003 survey, found that unions were an
important source of campaign contributions in local school board
elections and that influence increased based on the size of the district. 120
For example, in districts containing less than 5,000 students, unions
contributed to candidates in 22 percent of districts. 121 However, in
districts with more than 25,000 students, teachers’ unions contributed to
candidates in 94 percent of districts.122 Some may doubt the ability of
teachers’ unions to raise enough money to make substantial financial
contributions. However, a report by New Jersey’s Election Finance
Committee found that the New Jersey Education Association (“NJEA”),
the largest teachers’ union in the state, has spent over $57 million on
lobbying in the past 15 years.123 This demonstrates that teachers’ unions
116 T.M. MOE, TEACHERS’ UNIONS AND SCHOOL BOARD POLITICS, IN BESIEGED: SCHOOL
BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS (William G. Howell, ed., 2005); Heather
Rose & Jon Sonstelie, School Board Politics, School District Size, and the Bargaining Power
of Teachers’ Unions, 67 J. URB. ECON. 438, 439 (2010).
117 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 439.
118 Id.
119 T.M. MOE, UNION POWER AND THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN, IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS (Jane Hannaway &
Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006).
120 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 439 (citing T.M. MOE, TEACHERS’ UNIONS AND
SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS (2003)).
121
Id.
122 Id.
123 John Mooney, NJEA Spent Nearly $60M on Campaigns and Lobbying in Past 15
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possess the financial wherewithal to influence local and state elections.
All of these factors have made control over local school boards the
primary source of a teachers’ union’s political power.124 However, this
power has come at the expense of underprivileged communities in large
school districts.
The political disadvantage for homeowners is particularly acute in large districts
because the effort required to influence an election in a large district is rather
cumbersome. Teachers’ unions are able to execute the effort required to sway
elections in large districts because ‘union membership grows with district size
and the funds that a union can raise from its members increase with its
125
membership.’

Thus, teachers’ unions will be most powerful in larger districts, where the
voices of minorities and underprivileged communities are largely
situated.
However, it is important to note that teachers’ unions are not the
only organizations that lobby local school boards and exercise influence
over local elections. A study by T.T. Holyoke that surveyed charter
schools operating in Arizona, Michigan, and Pennsylvania found that a
majority of charter school organizations admitted to lobbying in at least
one governmental venue.126 Most notably, K12, Inc., a charter school
operator focusing on online learning and operating in New Jersey, spent
over $600,000 on lobbying efforts between 2007 and 2011.127 Education
Reform Now, a non-profit education reform think tank and advocacy
organization, outspent the New York teachers’ unions for lobbying
expenses in 2010.128 As a result, requiring that charter schools be
approved through local popular elections or local school board elections
will result in outcomes reflecting the desires of powerful interest groups
and the disenfranchisement of minorities and underprivileged
years, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/09/10/njeaspent-nearly-60m-on-campaigns-and-lobbying-in-past-15-years/.
124 Katherine O. Strunk & Jason A. Grissom, Do Strong Unions Shape District Policies?:
Collective Bargaining, Teacher Contract Restrictiveness, and the Political Power of
Teachers’ Unions, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 389, 391 (2010) (citing T.M.
Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (2006)).
125 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 439.
126 JEFFREY R. HENIG, THE END OF EXCEPTIONALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE
CHANGING POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM 138 (2013) (citing T.T. Holyoke, Choosing
Battlegrounds: Interest Group Lobbying Across Multiple Venues, 56 POL. RES. Q. 325, 325–
36 (2003)).
127 Id. (citing Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (DEC. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/education/online-schools-scorebetter-on-wall-street-than-in-classrooms.html?_r=2&pagewanted&).
128 Id.
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populations.
Additionally, it is important to address Rubin’s assertion that
NACSA has openly stated that the intent of the authorizing board is to
override local control.129 A plain reading of the language found in the
document does not lend itself to the conclusion that NACSA intentionally
wants to nullify local control. Instead, NACSA seems to merely express
a fear that some school boards acting as charter school authorizers may
have “conflicts of interest” that prevent them from fairly discharging their
duties as authorizers.130 Logically, as explained in the preceding
paragraphs, if a school board is effectively under the influence of
powerful interest groups that oppose the creation of charter schools, this
will end chartering.
Finally, it is important to note that these suggestions are not meant
to paint teachers’ unions or charter organizations as boogeymen. Instead,
these arguments demonstrate that local popular votes and local school
board votes are susceptible to influence and have arguably been
monopolized by teachers’ unions. Thus, these elections do not
necessarily result in the outcome local populations and disenfranchised
communities desire. Instead, these types of elections require local
populations to put faith in the magnanimity of interest groups like
teachers’ unions, which is not always the best option for a local
community.131
Because a local vote requirement may serve to only promote the
interests of powerful interests groups, ultimately, student and parent
school choice would be hindered. On the other hand, Senate Bill 2319’s
provisions for local input are sufficient to allow a charter school
authorizer to glean the local community’s sentiments while also
preventing powerful interest groups from holding too much influence
over charter school approvals, expansions or closures. Thus, Senate
Bill’s lack of a binding local vote requirement, and preservation of some
local input limits the influence of powerful interests groups and thus
secures the choice available to students and parents. This result advances
the original purpose of the Act.
129

Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZERS, supra note 88, at 2
131 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 441 (finding that in the context of collective
bargaining agreements, unions would be “more willing than voters to sacrifice nonteacher
expenditures or the number of teachers to secure an increase in salaries”); Strunk & Grissom,
supra note 124 (finding that contracts in districts with strong unions “allow school district
administrators less flexibility than do contracts in districts with weaker, less active unions.”).
130
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B. No “Mirroring” Requirement
As mentioned earlier, Mark Weber and Julia Sass Rubin published
a study examining the demographics of charter schools as compared to
the sending districts.132 Based on this methodology, Weber and Rubin
concluded that charter schools were not educating the same populations
as compared to the populations the local district schools were educating. 133
Mark Weber has referred to this method of comparison as the “simplest
and most illuminating way” to assess charter school populations.
Weber is correct in stating that the methodology he employed is
“simplest,” but incorrect in stating that it is the “most illuminating.”
Essentially, Weber and Rubin’s study fails to consider the diversity of
neighborhoods located within large school districts and to fully
appreciate the landscape of public schools in a district. Weber and
Rubin’s study assessed charter school demographics across the state,
paying particular attention to seven urban communities: Camden,
Hoboken, Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, and Trenton. 134
These communities can be further divided into various neighborhoods or
wards. Some of these neighborhoods and wards are economically diverse
as compared to other wards in the same communities and from the district
as a whole.
Newark provides the best example of ward-to-ward economic
diversity. The city of Newark is divided into five wards: North, South,
Central, East and West.135 A 2013 study conducted by the Rutgers
University Cornwall Center for Metropolitan Studies, in collaboration
with the Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, highlights the
economic diversity existing among the wards. 136 The study found that the
rate of poverty in Newark varies by ward.137 For example, nearly onethird of South and Central ward residents are in poverty, whereas the East
ward’s rate of poverty is only 18 percent.138 As a result, it is likely that

132 WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 96 (finding discrepancies in charter school education of
Free or Reduced Price Lunch students, LEP students, and special education students).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Newark
City
Ward
Boundaries
(2000),
RUTGERS
UNIV.,
http://policy.rutgers.edu/cupr/rcopc/data_atlas/6.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
136 LIZ MAHN ET. AL, BARRIERS TO UPWARD MOBILITY: A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF NEWARK
AND THE CHALLENGES TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 13 (Rutgers Univ. 2013), available at
http://policy.rutgers.edu/academics/projects/practicums/BarrierstoUpwardMobility.pdf.
137 Id. at 19.
138 Id.
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charter schools that cannot provide busing will not be able to bus poor
students from other wards, and charters facing a mirroring requirement
may be forced to ignore poverty-stricken students in their own
neighborhoods. Additionally, as pointed out by Carlos Perez in his
testimony before the Assembly Education Committee in 2013, a
mirroring requirement is unworkable because at the time of the lottery
process, charter schools only know whether an applicant is “age
appropriate and resides in the district,” and are not aware of the students’
socio-economic status.139
Therefore, a poverty-driven mirroring
requirement would not be feasible, especially in large-urban communities
The use of district averages also fails to appreciate different kinds of
public schools that already exist in some districts. In a recent op-ed, Rick
Pressler, interim president of the New Jersey Charter Schools
Association, highlighted that there are “at least six different types of
public school options” currently available in New Jersey.140 Included
among those six options are: charter schools, open-enrollment district
schools, selective public magnet schools, Renaissance schools (Urban
Hope Act), choice school districts, and selective county technical
vocational schools.141 Despite the fact that selective magnet schools and
vocational technical schools are allowed to cherry-pick top students, and
despite the fact that traditional public schools may not mirror a district’s
demographics, Weber and Rubin prefer imposing a mirroring
requirement solely on charter schools. These realities affect a charter
school’s applicant pool and the types of students they are capable of
admitting.
Additionally, it is important to note that Rubin and Weber’s study
bifurcates those students categorized as Free Lunch and Reduced Price
lunch in order to gain a deeper understanding of the population of
students educated by charter schools.142 Weber and Rubin suggest that
charter schools do not educate as many Free Lunch students, and thus
economically disadvantaged students, as their district counterparts, and
N.J. Charter Schs. Ass’n, Testimony by Carlos Perez Before the Assembly Education
Committee
on
A4177,
http://njcharters.org/index.php/start-a-charter-school/theapplication/doc_details/169-1330evaluationofsba?tmpl=component (last visited Feb. 15,
2014).
140 Rick Pressler, Op-Ed: Charter Schools are Best Way to Bring Equity to Education in
New Jersey, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/12/16/oped-charter-schools-are-the-best-way-to-bring-equity-to-education-in-nj/.
141 Id.
142 WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 96 at 27–32
139
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this affects the positivity of charter school test and performance results. 143
The authors of the study argue that schools that educate more Reduced
Price Lunch students than their counterparts have an “edge in producing
desirable academic outcomes.”144 However, there is one major flaw in the
authors’ arguments; the questionable assessment utility of free and
reduced price lunch monikers. For example, “the need for alternatives
and supplements is becoming more urgent, as recent federal rule changes
broaden eligibility for the program,” thus calling into question the
usefulness of the above mentioned monikers.145 Additionally, a 2010
study in Educational Researcher found that at least 20 percent of students
are “misidentified by school meals programs.”146 Statisticians at the
National Forum for Education Statistics, have become so concerned that
they have identified three alternative “interconnected aspects of poverty”
that may be used to create more representative poverty indexes:
“community-, neighborhood- and school-level socioeconomic status.”147
Therefore, the accuracy of free and reduced price labels is dubious, may
exaggerate any perceived demographical disparities within charter school
population, and may not accurately quantify the poverty faced by New
Jersey’s students. As such, Weber and Rubin’s conclusions must be
taken with a grain of salt.
In sum, a charter school should not be required to mirror a district’s
population. Charter schools are located in different neighborhoods and
sometimes face different applicant pools and feeder schools.148 Also, the
statistics and labels used to quantify poverty are questionable. Imposing
a mirroring requirement on one sort of public school and not on others is
inherently unfair. If a mirroring requirement were to be imposed, should
not all public schools in a district be required to adhere to that mirroring
143

Id. at 30.
Id.
145 Sarah D. Sparks, Popular Child-Poverty Measure Gets Another Look: Free-lunch
Measure Seen As Less Accurate, EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01povertymeasures.h34.html.
146 Id. (citing Michael Harwell & Brandon LeBeau, Student Eligibility for a Free Lunch
as an SES Measure in Education Research, 39 EDUC. RES. 120, 120–131 (2010)).
147 Id. (citing NAT’L CNTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, IMPROVING THE MEASURE OF
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS: A
THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION
(Nov.
2012),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/researchcenter/Socioeconomic_Factors.pdf.
148 For a study focusing on charter school demographics as compared to feeder schools
see CNTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN NEW JERSEY
(Stanford
Univ.
2012),
available
at
http://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/nj_state_report_2012_FINAL11272012.pdf.
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requirement? Furthermore, mirroring requirements limit a parent or
student’s ability to choose which school they would like to attend. This
result is at odds with the original purpose of the Act.
Instead of focusing on a mirroring requirement, scholars who
believe that charter schools are not adequately serving certain populations
should come up with legislative solutions that provide for better
advertising of charter school applications processes and lotteries.
Additionally, charter schools should only be accused of skimming or
intentionally cherry-picking skilled students if there is a discrepancy
between a charter school’s demographics as compared to those of its local
community and applicant pool. Thus far, there is no data suggesting that
is the case.
C. Funding Parity is Necessary for Charter Success
Notably absent from Senate Bill 2319 is any mention of charter
school funding parity. Essentially, Senate Bill 2319 would preserve the
current scheme posited under the Act, namely that charter schools receive
90 percent of the per pupil funding received by public district schools.149
The problem with the current scheme is that charter schools do not always
receive 90 percent of the per pupil funding that their public district
counterparts obtain.
In 2014, JerseyCAN, a non-profit education reform advocacy
organization, published The 90 Percent Myth, a brief analysis of funding
inequities between charter schools and their district counterparts.150 In
their analysis, JerseyCAN explains that charter schools are excluded from
certain types of aid, namely “adjustment, educational adequacy, school
choice and transportation aid.”151 As a result, there often exists a “funding
equity gap between district and charters that ranges from 20 percent to
29.9 percent.”152 JerseyCAN further postulates that if charter schools
actually received 90 percent of the per pupil funding that their district
counterparts received, charters would be entitled to approximately $43

149

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-12(b) (West 2014).
JerseyCAN, The 90 Percent Myth: Fixing Funding Inequities for New Jersey Charter
Schools, http://jerseycan.org/sites/jerseycan.org/files/90%25%20myth.pdf (last visited Feb.
9, 2015).
151 Id.
152 Id. (citing Measuring up to the Model: New Jersey, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
CHARTER SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-facts/law-database/states/NJ/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015)).
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million more in funding.153 According to Gloria-Bonilla Santiago, the
founder and board chair of Camden’s LEAP Academy University Charter
School, adjustment aid represents one of the primary sources of funding
inequity facing charter schools.154 As a result of the funding disparity
adjustment aid causes, the Camden city school district receives an extra
$17.6 million dollars in funding for students that have enrolled in charter
schools and no longer attend district-run schools.155
Santiago also refers to facilities funding as one of the primary
sources of funding inequity faced by charter schools.156 In general, New
Jersey law does not provide charter schools with public facilities or
facilities funding.157 Therefore, charter schools must use their operational
funding for the procurement of school facilities, sometimes spending
$1,418 per student on facilities expenditures.158 As a result of these
funding disparities, charter schools that want to expand their enrollment
cannot create adequate space for such an increase.159 This is especially
concerning considering that over 20,000 students are on various wait-lists
to enroll in charter schools.160
Senate Bill 2319 should be amended to include a provision making
charter schools eligible for adjustment, educational adequacy, school
choice, transportation, and facilities funding aid. In other words, if
charters are paying for their own facilities, providing transportation, or
afford services similar to those that districts schools are responsible for,
those charters should be compensated. The problem with the funding
disparity between charters and district schools is the apparently inherent
assumption that charters are “lesser” entities. There seems to be a popular
sentiment that charter schools take money away from public schools, and
153

Id. at 2.
Gloria-Bonilla Santiago, Op-Ed: Dollars Don’t Make Sense -- Time to Improve
Charter
School
Funding,
NJ
SPOTLIGHT
(Feb.
13,
2015),
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/15/02/12/op-ed-dollars-don-t-make-sense-time-toimprove-charter-school-funding/.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. (citing An Analysis of the Charter School Facility Landscape in New Jersey,
CHARTER
SCH.
FACILITIES
INITIATIVE,
http://njcharters.org/docs/report_facilitiesanalysis_201301.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2015)).
159 The 90 Percent Myth: Fixing Funding Inequities for New Jersey Charter Schools,
supra note 150.
160 N.J. Charter Sch.s. Ass’n, Charter Schools Continue to Grow Throughout New Jersey,
http://njcharters.org/index.php/9-news/117-charter-schools-continue-to-grow-throughoutnew-jersey (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
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many charter schools and charter school associations have gone to great
lengths to dispel that myth.161
The logic supporting that popular misconception fails to recall that
public schools and charter schools are public schools. Students who
choose to attend charter schools, and therefore divert their per-pupil
funding to attend charter schools, are simply reallocating public funds to
another public institution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Charter school creation and growth has been a controversial topic
since the inception of the Charter School Program Act of 1995. Senator
Teresa Ruiz is one of the state’s most prominent policymakers and Julia
Sass Rubin is one of the state’s most recognizable scholars, and they were
kind enough to share their time to advance this discussion. It is evident
that both of them share one thing in common; they want what is best for
students and communities. For that reason, their hard work should be
respected immensely. Nevertheless, this respect should never prevent an
author from exhibiting utter honesty and forthrightness.
First, a local binding vote would only serve the interests of powerful
interests groups, forgo valuable administrative expertise, and further
disenfranchise underprivileged, minority communities.
Local
populations simply do not possess the expertise and political neutrality
necessary to deal with complex issues like charter school management
and educational methodology. Furthermore, due to low-voter turnout,
California Charter Sch.s. Ass’n, Dispelling Myths About Charter Schools,
http://www.calcharters.org/understanding/faqs/myths.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2015) (“In
California, public school funding follows the student, with the funding going to the public
school the parents choose, whether a charter school or a traditional district school. When
charter public schools are funded, there is no overall loss of public school money because
charter schools are public schools.”); Charter School Misconceptions, CHARTER SCHOOL FOR
APPLIED TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.csat-k12.org/Page/21 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (In
New York State, school districts only contribute about 66% of each charter school students’
expenses, meaning that when a student leaves, the remaining 33% of his/her funding stays
with the home school district. The charter school gets 66% of the money and 100% of the
student!”); National Conference of State Legislatures, Charter School Finance (Feb. 2011),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/charterschoolfinance.pdf (“Defenders of
traditional public schools are concerned that charter schools are taking money away from
those schools. Simply having one less student does not proportionally decrease the burden
on a district. It likely still needs the same number of teachers, other staff, the same facilities
and the same instructional materials. However, losing students to a charter school or another
traditional school have the same effects and traditional schools have always had to adjust to
enrollment changes.”).
161

FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE

11/3/2015 3:49 PM

387

teachers’ unions exercise an inordinate amount of influence over local
school board elections and members. This influence only becomes more
powerful in larger districts, where underprivileged, minority
communities are located. Therefore, placing control over charter schools
in the hands of a board inveigled by powerful interests would further
disenfranchise underprivileged populations.
Second, requiring that charter school demographics mirror those of
the sending district ignores the racial, ethnic, and economic diversity that
exists in the neighborhoods and wards of larger cities. In a study prepared
by Rutgers University, it is evident that racial and ethnic diversity is
pronounced across Newark’s wards, thus making it impracticable for
charter schools to meet any mirroring requirement. Moreover, a
mirroring requirement almost certainly would require local charter
schools to forsake needy populations within their local neighborhoods in
order to meet artificially imposed mirroring requirements. Instead,
scholars should propose ideas that foster better advertising and awareness
of charter school applications and lotteries.
Finally, Senate Bill 2319 must address funding disparities between
charters and their district counterparts. Charter schools would be able to
accommodate more students on their ever-growing wait-lists if they could
receive transportation, adjustment, educational adequacy, and school
choice aid. Unfortunately, the funding parity issue is a vestige of an
inherent assumption that charter schools are inferior or unequal. Funding
parity is a step towards removing the inherent assumption of inferiority.
Only with these provisions can New Jersey adhere to the promises it made
under the Charter School Program Act of 1995.
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